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A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MINUTE 242*
ALLEN V. KNEESE**

In contrast to the other contributors to this symposium, I am not
an expert on the Colorado River. I was asked to comment rather
generally on the matter of international rivers from the point of view
of an economist, and thereby perhaps to put the discussion of the
Colorado salinity agreement in a somewhat widened context. To do
this, it is helpful to have some sort of taxonomy of the types of
situations characteristic of international watercourses. 1 Four types
of situations seem to characterize most cases involving international
watercourses.
First, the more or less pure "public goods" situations. These are
instances in which all the riparian states have equal access to the
watercourse and in which the use of one does not diminish the
benefits to others. Examples might be navigation on a noncongested
boundary stream or recreational use of an international river which
does not diminish its quantity or quality.
The second situation is where development in an upstream country provides benefits in both the upstream and downstream
countries. Examples are flow regulation for hydropower production
in the upstream country which simultaneously makes the river-flow
more even in the downstream country and therefore more valuable
for uses such as hydropower production or diversion for irrigation.
The third type is the strict "common property" situation. This is
where all the riparian countries have equal access to the watercourse
but use of the watercourse by one diminishes its value for others. For
example, use of a boundary body of water for irrigation or for waste
disposal fits this category. Navigation on a congested waterway
would be another instance.
Fourth, a "zero sum" situation may prevail where use of the water
resource by an upstream country diminishes benefits to the downstream countries but where the downstream users cannot retaliate in
*Presented at Oaxtepec, Mexico, March 15, 1974.
**Professor, Department of Economics, University of New Mexico.
1. The taxonomy I use is adapted from the somewhat more elaborate one presented by
D. DeMarquand, Research Into the Management of International Rivers, February 15, 1974
(unpublished paper, University of British Columbia).
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any direct way. This is the pure upstream-downstream conflict situation.
There are different national imperatives and motivations associated with these different kinds of situations. In the first type there is
really no conflict and consequently no sort of international agreement is needed. In types two and three, there clearly are possibilities
for mutual gains from some sort of an agreement.
For example, in the second situation the downstream country
would be motivated to attempt to influence the upstream country to
provide flow regulation even if the benefits in the upstream country
could not suffice to cover the costs but the sum of the downstream
and upstream benefits did. Alternatively, perhaps it would be motivated to bargain for an increase in the degree of flow regulation which
the upstream country would otherwise provide for its own purposes.
In the third situation it is possible that the various riparian countries could each gain from agreeing to limit their use of the waterway. This does not of course mean that such agreements would
necessarily be accomplished. When a large number of countries with
different ideologies and cultural backgrounds are involved, agreement
may be very difficult. For example, even though all of the riparian
countries around the Baltic Sea are technically advanced, and the sea
is clearly deteriorating because of excessive waste disposal, they have
not been able to reach any sort of meaningful agreement. The situation in the Mediterranean would seem to be even more complex and
perhaps even hopeless. Nevertheless, in situations two and three,
possibility for mutual gain may be a powerful force in the direction
of achieving agreement.
However, in the "zero sum situation," if one views the matter
from a narrow economic point of view, there can be no basis for
agreement unless the victim country compensates the damaging
country for costs incurred to reduce the damage. If the damaging
country acts in its own immediate economic self-interest, it will not
be willing to reach any other sort of an agreement. Surely the salinity
situation in the Colorado is of this "zero sum" type.
An interesting illustration of this type of situation, giving rise to
the victim-pays result, is found in the case of the Rhine River. The
Netherlands being at the terminus of that river stands in somewhat
the same relation to the upstream coriparians as Mexico does to the
United States on the Colorado. Indeed, the main water quality problem is the same one-salinity. The Dutch are experiencing increasing
difficulty in using the Rhine River waters for both industrial and
municipal purposes. Accordingly, in 1972, they agreed to pay the
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French, who are the main source of salinity in the Rhine River, 35
percent of the costs of control to reduce the salinity of the river.
But, in the case of the Colorado, the United States has agreed to
pay the entire cost of mitigating the situation. If the United States
had been acting on the basis of a narrow interpretation of economic
self-interest, it either would have done nothing or would have required Mexico to pay the costs of the mitigation. This, then, leads
one to wonder what factors, other than magnitudes and distribution
of strictly economic costs and benefits, could be important in a U.S.
decision. Economic costs and benefits are, of course, always pertinent to the development of national decisions. But if they had been
the only consideration, the situation never would have turned out
the way it did.
It appears that in many cases negotiations about international
rivers involve considerations which are in quite other arenas, and in
many cases these "extraneous" considerations have been dominant.
In other words, it is impossible to understand the outcome of such
international negotiations simply by looking at the particular situation which is the apparent focus of the negotiations. A much wider
view of the national and international considerations involved must
be taken. Indeed, it may be that even the initiation of negotiations
on an international river problem is more related to other considerations of national interest-and clearly the results often are. For example, Krutilla has shown that various' considerations, including
military strategic ones, caused the United States to agree to a treaty
on the Columbia which was quite unfavorable to it economically.'
Thus, matters such as trade concessions, military bases, and the desire to win allies in international politics may often be overriding
considerations.
In addition, the image a country wishes to project to the outside
world may sometimes be important. One might interpret the agreement of the Swiss, who are at the head of the Rhine River, to pay 5
percent of the costs of reducing salt discharges in France as being a
result of this objective. A related consideration might be the attitude
of a particular country toward international law. My own conjecture
is that these latter considerations are not nearly so important as the
more directly national self-interest-related ones mentioned earlier. As
long as all interested parties have something of value to trade, the
outcome of this kind of process may not be so arbitrary or irrational
as it might at first seem. Indeed, as long as national self-interest is the
primary motive force in international affairs, as I believe it is, this
2. J. Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty (1967).

NA TURA L RESO UR CES JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

type of broad trading process seems to be the only one that can lead
to international agreements, especially in the "zero sum" type of
situation that characterizes the salinity problem of the Colorado
River.
Indeed, such larger factors seem to have been very important in all
the major Mexican-American water agreements which have been
achieved. During the 1939 to 1944 negotiations over the Colorado
and the Rio Grande, one factor which caused the United States to
agree to an allocation of 1.5 million acre-feet per year of Colorado
River water to Mexico, an amount far above historical usage in the
Mexicali Valley, was its desire to cultivate friendly relations with
other countries, especially neighboring countries, during the Second
World War. In that case, however, the situation was more complex
than the present one since agreements for both rivers were being
negotiated simultaneously, and the United States did have a direct
economic interest in reaching an agreement on the Rio Grande. This
was so since most of the water in the lower Rio Grande (below Fort
Quitman, Texas) originates from the Mexican tributaries.
The 1973 agreement also seems to have been a situation in which
the United States was anxious to cultivate more favorable relations
with Latin American countries and, more generally, to reduce international stresses in the world at large.
Even if the agreement was the result of national self-interest, and I
think it must be interpreted to have been so, many people on both
sides of the border, including myself, feel that a very unfortunate
injustice may now have been corrected. Or if they are a little skeptical, also like myself, about whether the injustice actually has been
corrected they are at least encouraged that it has been faced up to.
But, to an economist at least, it is very interesting to observe the
means the United States has chosen for implementing the agreement.
In this connection, I should like to call attention to an interesting
paper prepared for the United Nations by Irving Fox and several
coauthors in which are found a number of premises about international agreements on rivers. 3 Premise No. 4 reads as follows: "Configuration of power and influence within a country may have an
important bearing on the kind of program acceptable to it and upon
how the planning and implementation of the program can be done
effectively." Examples of such internal forces affecting the nature of
agreements reached can be found in negotiations between the United
3. I. Fox, H. Gotzman, S. Smith, & U. Torti, Administration of International Rivers
(presented at the United Nations Panel of Experts on Legal and Institutional Implications of
International Water Resources Development, Vienna, Austria, December 9-14, 1968).
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States and Canada both on the St. Lawrence and the Columbia. In
both cases regional interests had a powerful influence on the specific
nature of the agreements reached.
These forces internal to the country seem to be especially clear in
the salinity agreement. The motivation of the basin states seems to
have been a determination not to lose a single drop of water to
Mexico no matter what it might cost the general taxpayer in the
United States. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that it
would have been far cheaper to buy the necessary water rights to
send pure water to the Mexicali Valley than to implement the means
actually chosen- primarily the desalting plant. William Martin's paper
in this symposium goes even further to assert that the problem could
have been solved with no net cost to the United States whatsoever.
Dean Mann's paper analyzes the politics of the situation which
permits the states, or at least historically has permitted the western
states, to shove most of the cost of water development on to the
general tax burden of the U.S. taxpayer. What we have as a result is a
wildly uneconomic approach to the problem of reducing salinity in
the Mexicali Valley.4
The diplomatic language characteristic of international negotiations terms the agreement which was reached a "definitive and final
solution" to the problem. There is, however, a little space between
the diplomatic language and the realities of the situation. There are
still, as several of the papers in this volume make clear, large disagreements within the United States concerning how the agreement is to
be implemented, and action by Congress is required on a number of
points. The difficulties of reaching agreement may be exacerbated if
the wildly uneconomic nature of the solutions proposed becomes
more generally known.
Furthermore, as Dregne's paper makes clear, further increases in
salinity of the Colorado River are inevitable. This, no doubt, will in
due course raise the issue of permitted absolute levels of salinity to
be delivered to the Mexicans rather than the relative prescription
found in the agreement. The latter, as a number of the papers point
out, links the permitted deliveries of salt to what arrives at the Imperial Dam in the United States.
4. The extreme and, it seems to me, rather convoluted position of the basin states on not
losing water to Mexico is exemplified by the assertion that the U.S. taxpayer should be
responsible for replacing the 43,000 acre-feet of brine which will flow from the desalting
plant directly to the Gulf of California because, it is argued, this involves an increase in
water deliveries to Mexico. See M. Hulbert, Values and Choices in the Development of an
Arid Land River Base (paper delivered before a meeting of the American Association for
Advancement of Science, San Francisco, California, February 24-March 1, 1974).
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Finally, if the means proposed in the agreement are adopted, the
control of salinity for the Mexicali Valley will depend on the continued operation of a very expensive and somewhat experimental
piece of machinery, namely, the large-scale desalting plant. This
problem may well be exacerbated by the energy requirements of the
facility which will occur in a region where there is already much
disputation about the environmental effects of increasing electrical
generation capacity.
In my opinion, the agreement cannot realistically be regarded as
the final and definitive solution. But at least the issue has been
joined, and we may hope that this will lead to careful consideration
of the salinity management problem of the Lower Colorado as a
whole, including both the acreages in the United States and in Mexico, and to some innovative thinking about what sort of institutional
arrangements might be appropriate to a situation of this type. I am
not very optimistic that this will happen, but at least the issue has
been brought out of the darkness and into the daylight.

